SEO Text Generator: Kostenlos Marketing Content und Artikel Texte schreiben

Konfiguriere, welcher SEO Text automatisiert für dich erstellt werden soll!

Werbung / Anzeige:

Bitte verlinke uns auf hochwertigen Webseiten:

Melde dich zum kostenlosen ArtikelSchreiber Newsletter an!
Mehr Werbeumsätze pro Monat? Selbstständiges Business? Finanziell frei werden? Erfahre hier wie!

Mit deiner geschäftlichen Email Adresse anmelden und erfahren wie:

Artikeltext wurde erstellt!


Friendship (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

SEO Überschriften:    

  1. h1:


  2. h2:

    1. The Nature of Friendship

  3. h3:

    1.1 Mutual Caring

  4. h4:



53 Minutes, 43 Seconds


Dein Artikel ist in deutscher Sprache geschrieben

Haupt Schlagwort (Thema des Artikels):    


Neben Schlagwort (Nuance des Textes):    


Hauptthemen des einzigartigen Inhaltes:    

which ✓ not ✓ our ✓ value ✓ such ✓ for ✓ and ✓ that ✓ friendship ✓ are ✓ the ✓ moral ✓ friend ✓ this ✓ friends


For this reason, most contemporary accounts, by focusing their attention on the non-deficient forms of friendship, ignore pleasure and utility friendships. For this reason, many authors argue that to be friends with bad people reveals a potentially morally condemnable evaluative defect (see, e.g., Isserow 2018). Telfer (1970–71, 238) answers that friendship promotes the general good by providing a degree and kind of consideration for others welfare which cannot exist outside it.

Artikel Inhalt:    

<p style="display: none;"> <script type="application/ld+json">{ "@context": "", "@type": "Article", "image": { "@type": "ImageObject", "url": "", "width": 531, "height": 628 }, "name": "Article", "url": "", "description": " ...", "headline": "Friendship (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)", "dateCreated": "2022-02-19T03:06:22+01:00", "datePublished": "2022-02-19T03:06:22+01:00", "dateModified": "2022-02-19T03:06:22+01:00", "articleBody": "For this reason most contemporary accounts by focusing their attention on the non-deficient forms of friendship ignore pleasure and utility friendships. For this reason many authors argue that to be friends with bad people reveals a potentially morally condemnable evaluative defect (see e.g. Isserow 2018). Telfer (1970–71 238) answers that friendship promotes the general good by providing a degree and kind of consideration for others welfare which cannot exist outside it. Source:", "mainEntityOfPage": { "@type": "WebPage", "@id": "" }, "publisher": { "@type": "Organization", "@id": "", "url": "", "name": "", "description": "Dein kostenloser SEO Text Generator |", "logo": { "@type": "ImageObject", "@id": "", "url": "", "width": 531, "height": 628 }, "image": { "@type": "ImageObject", "@id": "", "url": "", "width": 531, "height": 628 }, "sameAs": [ "" ] }, "keywords": "which, not, our, value, such, for, and, that, friendship, are, the, moral, friend, this, friends", "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "", "url": "", "sameAs": [ "" ] }, "@id": "", "commentCount": "0", "sameAs": [ "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ], "speakable": { "@type": "SpeakableSpecification", "xpath": [ "/html/head/title", "/html/head/meta[@name='description']/@content" ] } } </script> </p><br /><br /> .
Dieser Artikel wurde mit dem automatischen SEO Text Generator erstellt - Versuche es kostenlos selbst!

Einzigartiger Artikel Text: Bewertung der Einzigartigkeit: 95%

<p style="display: none;"> <script type="application/ld+json">{ "@context": "", "@type": "Article", "image": { "@type": "ImageObject", "url": "", "width": 531, "height": 628 }, "name": "Article", "url": "", "description": " ...", "headline": "Friendship (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)", "dateCreated": "2022-02-19T03:06:22+01:00", "datePublished": "2022-02-19T03:06:22+01:00", "dateModified": "2022-02-19T03:06:22+01:00", "articleBody": "Friendship is a distinctively personal relationship grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other for the other's sake and that involves some degree of intimacy . the book was first published Tue May 17 2005 substantive revision Fri Jul 30 2021. the nature of friendship Friendship essentially involves a distinctive kind of concern for your friend a concern which might reasonably be understood as a kind of love . Source:", "mainEntityOfPage": { "@type": "WebPage", "@id": "" }, "publisher": { "@type": "Organization", "@id": "", "url": "", "name": "", "description": "Dein kostenloser SEO Text Generator |", "logo": { "@type": "ImageObject", "@id": "", "url": "", "width": 531, "height": 628 }, "image": { "@type": "ImageObject", "@id": "", "url": "", "width": 531, "height": 628 }, "sameAs": [ "" ] }, "keywords": "which, not, our, value, such, for, and, that, friendship, are, the, moral, friend, this, friends", "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "", "url": "", "sameAs": [ "" ] }, "@id": "", "commentCount": "0", "sameAs": [ "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ], "speakable": { "@type": "SpeakableSpecification", "xpath": [ "/html/head/title", "/html/head/meta[@name='description']/@content" ] } } </script> </p><br /><br /> Friendship is a distinctively personal relationship grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other, for the other's sake, and that involves some degree of intimacy . the book was first published Tue May 17, 2005; substantive revision Fri Jul 30, 2021. the nature of friendship Friendship essentially involves a distinctive kind of concern for your friend, a concern which might reasonably be understood as a kind of love . "trade up" when someone new comes along may be permissible in cases where the demands of friendship seem to conflict . agape is a kind of love that does not respond to the antecedent value of its object . eros and philia are generally understood to be responsive to the merits of their objects . philia seems to be that which is most relevant to friendship . love and friendship often get lumped together as a single topic . however, there are significant differences between them . unrequited friendship is essentially a kind of relationship grounded in a particular kind of special concern each has for the other as the person she is . whereas we must make conceptual room for the idea of unreasonable love, unreached friendship is senseless . eros-philia friendships are grounded in a kind of reciprocal love that is responsive to merit . romantic love normally has a sort of sexual involvement that friendship lacks . but is that enough to explain the real differences between the two? in philosophical discussions of friendship, it is common to follow Aristotle in distinguishing three kinds of friendship: friendships of pleasure, of utility, and of virtue . timothy stanley: friendships involve a concern for your friend for his sake and not for your own . he says it's ok to love a friend because of the pleasure he gets out of her, or because she's useful to me . all three kinds of friendship seem to involve the involvement of love in each case . bob greene: it looks like pleasure and utility friendships are at best deficient modes of friendship . he says virtue friendships, because they are motivated by excellences of your friend's character, are genuine, non-deficient friendships . greene argues that if you benefit your friend because of the benefits you receive, it would seem you do not properly love your friend for his sake . 'philia' extends not just to friends but also to family members, business associates, and one's country at large. most philosophers think not, understanding friendship to be essentially a relationship among equals . some philosophers explicitly intend their accounts of friendship to include parent-child relationships . in philosophical accounts of friendship, several themes recur consistently . they are mutual caring (or love), intimacy, and shared activity . these themes will be considered in turn . many accounts of friendship do not analyze such mutual caring any further . there is considerable variability as to how we should understand the kind of caring involved in friendship . caring about someone for his sake involves both sympathy and action on the friend's behalf. a central difference among the various accounts of mutual caring is the way in which these accounts understand the kind of evaluation implicit therein . to care about something is generally to find it worthwhile or valuable in some way; caring about a friend is no exception . many authors argue that to be friends with bad people reveals a potentially morally condemnable evaluative defect . others, however, understand caring as in part a matter of bestowing value on your beloved . in caring about a friend, we thereby project a kind of intrinsic value onto him . appealing to an appraisal of the good qualities of your friend's character in order to justify your friendship is not on its own to subordinate your friendship to that appraisal . instead, through the friendship, and through changes in your friend over time, you may come to change your evaluative outlook . the idea that friends have a reciprocal effect on each other is a part of the concern for equality many find essential to friendship . it is central to the discussion of intimacy in Section 1 . there is considerable variation in the literature on intimacy of friendship . it raises the question whether different accounts aim at elucidating the same object . cases of close friendship can be understood to be an enhanced version of acquaintance friendship . cases of friendship should be understood as being deficient in various ways relative to ideal friendship, for example . views will be presented roughly in order from weaker to stronger accounts of intimacy. Thomas: mutual self-disclosure creates a "bond of trust" essential to friendship . he says it's what institutes the kind of intimacy characteristic of friendship, a bond of trust . secrets view underestimates the kind of trust at issue in friendship, conceiving of it largely as a matter of discretion . at best it is the sharing of what friends care about that is relevant . friendship involves trust in your friend's judgment concerning what is in your best interests . if your friend sees you harming yourself, she ought, other things being equal, to intervene . you can come to rely on her to do so . sally kohn-telfer: a friend's shared interests are central to the "sense of a bond" she says it's important to trust that she understands who i am and that i find certain things valuable . she says she also trusts that she knows the value of these things that are so meaningful to her . her friend is a "solidarity" person who shares values and a sense of what is important . Telfer and White, in appealing to such shared sense of value, are offering a somewhat richer sense of the sort of intimacy essential to friendship than Thomas and Annis . a question to ask, however, is what precisely is meant by the "sharing" of a feeling of value . Aristotle's friend is one who wishes and does good (or apparently good) things to a friend, for the friend's sake, (2) wishes the friend to exist and live, for his own sake, (3) spends time with his friend, (4) makes the same choices and (5) finds the same things pleasant and painful as his friend. Aristotle (and Annas) would reject this reading: friends do not merely have such similarities antecedent to their friendship as a necessary condition of friendship . Rather, friends can influence and shape each other's evaluative outlook . my friend plays an entirely passive role in my friend's evaluative outlooks . by being himself, he enables me to come to understand my own character better . the authors of this paper argue that this view places too much emphasis on similarity as motivating and sustaining the friendship . they say that this should be understood as an effect of friendship, not something constitutive of it . the appeal to the friend's role as a mirror to explain the increasing similarity involves assigning too much passivity . Lynch (2005) provides further criticisms of the mirroring view, arguing that the differences between friends can be central and important to their friendship . Millgram (1987) claims that in mirroring my friend I am causally responsible for my friend coming to have and sustain the virtues he has . millgram: for this reason, Millgram claims, I come to love my friend in the same way I love myself . he says this explains why friendships of pleasure and utility, which do not involve such procreation, fail to be genuine friendships . millgram says aristotle's claim that a friend is "another self" is not fungible, given my role as procreator of this particular person . Millgram's understanding of mirroring does not escape Cocking & Kennett's criticism of mirrors views as assigning too much passivity to the friend as mirror . Friedman (1989) offers another way to make sense of the influence my friend has on my sense of value by appealing to the notion of bestowal . john Friedman: one's behavior toward a friend takes its appropriateness, at least in part, from her goals and aspirations, her needs, her character . Friedman thinks my commitment to my friend cannot be grounded in appraisals of her, so my acknowledgment of the worth of her goals . a friend's commitment involves taking her friend seriously, says aaron carroll . carroll: friendship involves friends mutually influencing each other's sense of value . he says this underwrites significant intimacy . the dynamics of the friendship relation involves friendship mutually influence each other . Whiting (1991) argues that such an approach fails properly to make sense of the idea that I love my friend for her sake . to require that my friend's values be my own is to blur the distinction . the solution, she claims, is to understand the value of my ends (or yours) to be independent of the fact that they are mine . these ends are intrinsically valuable, and that's why i should care about them, no matter whose ends they are. Whiting advocates what she calls an "impersonal" conception of friendship . she says that her "differential and apparently personal concern for only some ... is largely a function of historical and psychological accident" Whiting: "my concern for my friend be for her sake is my being committed to remind her of what's really valuable in life" "a relationship characterized by such a commitment on both sides is one that consistently and non-accidentally reinforces the sharing of these values" the complaint is the same as that which Friedman (1989) offered against any conception of friendship that bases that friendship on appraisals of the friend's properties, thereby neglecting what makes friendship a distinctively personal relationship. Brink: unless our account of love and friendship attaches intrinsic significance to the historical relationship between friends, it seems unable to justify concern for the friend qua friend. in friendship, friends play a more active role in transforming each other's evaluative outlook . "to be directed by your friend is to allow her interests, values, etc. to change our interests, they say. Opera is a great way to learn about yourself, in particular of your strengths and weaknesses, to be shaped by your friend's interpretations of you. "the self my friend sees is, at least in part, a product of the friendship," claim cocking & kennett . "your interpretation of your friend can reveal possible valuable ways to be that you yourself could never have even imagined beforehand" Is it a matter of merely passively accepting the direction and interpretation of your friend? aaron carroll: a friend's receptivity to being drawn by your friend is suggested by a theory of friendship . carroll says it is a question of ceding your autonomy to your friend and that is surely not what they intend . bob greene: friendship can be a good motivator for direction and interpretation . he says we recognize the independent value of the interests of our friends . but friendship might just as easily accept such directions and interpretation from a mentor or even a stranger . the truth of their interpretations of us would not explain the role of friendship . bob greene: friendship might push us to a stronger conception of intimacy, of the sharing of values . he says we can understand why friendship grounds these norms. aristotle: friends identify with each other in the sense that they exhibit a "singleness of mind" this includes, first, a kind of sympathy, whereby I feel on my friend's behalf the same emotions he does . aristotle: in part for this reason, Sherman claims that "through the sense of belonging and attachment" we attain because of such sympathetic pride and shame, "we identify with and share their [our friends'] good" he says the singleness of mind that friends have in terms of shared processes of deliberation. bob greene: friends "share" a conception of values not in that there is significant overlap between the values of one friend and those of the other . he says the values are shared in the sense that they are most fundamentally their values, at which they jointly arrive by deliberating together. friends begin to express that shared commitment through mutual decisions about practical matters . any happiness or disappointment that follows from these actions belongs to both persons, for the decision to so act was joint and the responsibility is thus shared . aristotle: this account of friendship raises concerns about autonomy . he says it does away with any clear distinction between the interests and even agency of the two friends . this undermins the kind of independence and freedom of self-development that characterizes autonomy. Sherman's interpretation of Aristotle is unclear whether there are principled reasons to limit the extent to which we share our identities with our friends . perhaps an appeal to something like Friedman's federation model can help resolve these difficulties . Friedman's account of the kind of intimacy and commitment that are characteristic of friendship . in each of these accounts, we might ask about the conditions under which friendship can properly be dissolved. when it is proper to break off a friendship, or allow it to lapse, may shed light on the kind of commitment and intimacy that is characteristic of friendship . common thread in philosophical accounts of friendship is shared activity . friends engage in joint pursuits, in part motivated by the friendship itself . these pursuits can include things like making something together, playing together, talking together . they can also include pursuits that essentially involve shared experiences, such as going to the opera together. in what sense can such activity be said to be "shared," and what is it about friendship that makes shared activity so central to it? edward mccaffery: it must be pursued in part for the purpose of doing it together with my friend . he says this raises the question: how can shared activity be called 'shared'? the account of shared activity within a particular theory should depend at least in part on that theory's understanding of the kind of intimacy relevant to friendship . in the literature on friendship the notion of shared or joint activity is largely taken for granted . not much thought has been given to articulating clearly the sense in which friends share their activity . a theory of friendship might be criticized in terms of the way in which its account of the intimacy of friendship yields a poor account of activity is shared. any account of the intimacy of friendship that fails to understand the sharing of interests should be rejected . Helm (2008) develops an account of shared activity and shared valuing at least partly with an eye to understanding friendship . the intimacy of friendship should be understood partly in terms of the friends forming a "plural agent": a group of people who have joint cares—a joint evaluative perspective—which he analyzes in terms . of interpersonally connected emotions, desires, judgments, and (shared) actions. the value and justification of friendship Friendship clearly plays an important role in our lives . it is important to understand not only why friendship can be valuable, but also what justifies particular friendships . bob greene: what makes friendship worthwhile for me? he says one answer is that friendship is "life enhancing" in that it makes us "feel more alive" it enhances our activities by intensifying our absorption in them and hence the pleasure we get out of them . aristotle: friendship helps promote self-esteem, which is good both instrumentally and for its own sake . but friendship is not merely instrumentally valuable, as is hinted at by Annis' claim that "our lives would be significantly less full given the universal demise of friendship" aristotle: a flourishing life is possible only through the epistemic access friendship provides . the kind of shared activity characteristic of friendship is essential to living well, he says . activities include moral and intellectual activities, activities in which it is often difficult to sustain interest . Cooper concludes that the shared activity of friendship is partly constitutive of human flourishing . Biss argues that friendship and the sort of trust friendship involves, are a central and necessary part of the pursuit of moral self-perfection. Schoeman (1985) claims that in friendship the friends "become a unique community with a being and value of its own" he does not clearly explain what the value of that "unique community" is or why it should have that value. cf. Friedman 1998) existence and value of friendship . what justifies my being friends with this person rather than with someone else or no one at all? friends are fungible if they contribute (either instrumentally or constitutively) to a flourishing life for me . but this seems unacceptable because it suggests—what is surely false—that friends are ‘fungible’ . friends are replaced by a relevantly similar object without any loss of value . philosophers have typically focused on features of the historical relationship of friendship . in solving this problem of fungibility, philosophers typically focus on characteristics of the relationship . "trade up" might be objectionable as an understanding of friendship. aaron carroll: if my friend and i form a kind of union in virtue of our having a shared conception of how to live, it is simply not possible to substitute another person for my friend without loss . he says my sense of my values and identity therefore depends on these being most fundamentally our values and identities . for this other person could not possibly share the relevant properties of my friend, namely her historical relationship with me. the reasons we have for initiating a friendship are impersonal in a way that allows for fungibility . the latter, she suggests, are to be found in our history of concern for each other . if we want to sustain a friend, we need to understand these historical, relational properties of my friend . a friend of mine is going through a rough time so that he loses those virtues justifying my initial friendship with him . why shouldn't i just dump him and strike up a new friendship with someone who has these virtues? in part the trouble here arises from tacit preconceptions concerning the nature of justification . bob greene: friendship seems to imply that justification in general requires the appeal to the friend's being a type of person . he says this leads to the problem of fungibility. overcoming this preconception concerning justification is a task no one has attempted in the literature on friendship. Telfer (1970–71, 238) answers that friendship promotes the general good by providing a degree and kind of consideration for others' welfare which cannot exist outside it. Cocking & Kennett (2000) argue against this view that friendly acts per se are morally good . they claim that "i might be a perfectly good friend. I might just not be an perfectly moral one" Cocking & Kennett seem to be insufficiently sensitive to the idea that friends care about promoting each other's well-being. Koltonski (2016) argues that one ought to ensure that one's friend is properly engaging in moral deliberation, but then defer to one’s friend's judgment about what to do, even when one disagrees with the moral conclusion . for such deference is a matter of properly respecting the friend’s moral agency . Friedman (1989) argues that friendship itself is socially valuable in a way that love is not . Friedman notes that friendship can involve the mutual support of, in particular, unconventional values . sally kohn: we tend to privilege in our loves and friendships "people like us" which can give rise to biases in favor of certain social identities like race, class, and sexual orientation . she says this can perpetuate inequalities among these groups, reinforce epistemic injustices, and limit our moral development . her: we might worry that friendship can have negative consequences for society as a whole . deontological and consequentialist moral theories have been criticized for being incompatible with friendship . many have criticized them on the grounds that they are somehow incompatible . with the kind of reasons and motives that friendship provides . friendship involves special duties: duties for specific people that arise out of the relationship of friendship . it seems that we have obligations to aid and support our friends that go well beyond those we have to help strangers because they are our friends . can obligations to our friends sometimes trump our moral duties, or must we always subordinate our personal relationships to morality in order to be properly impartial (as, it might be thought, morality demands)? stocker: such moral schizophrenia prevents us in general from harmonizing our moral reasons and our motives . he says it destroys the very possibility of having and sustaining friendships with others . Stocker (1981) argues that the characteristic actions of friendship cannot be understood in this way. To be a friend is at least sometimes to be motivated to act out of a concern for your friend as this individual. stocker: actions done out of friendship are essentially actions motivated by a special sort of concern . this is in part a matter of having settled habits of response to the friend . stocker concludes that this is a kind of motivation for action that a teleological conception of action cannot countenance . Stocker (1976) raises another, more general concern for consequentialism and deontology arising out of a conception of friendship. act consequentialists must exhibit moral schizophrenia, or to avoid it, they must understand consequentialist reasons for action to be our motives . taking this latter tack would be to leave out the kind of reasons and motives that are central to friendship, thereby undermining the very institution of friendship . rule consequentialism and deontology can provide moral reasons for friendly actions in terms of the rule that one must benefit one's friends, for example, but such reasons would be impersonal, giving no special consideration to our particular friends . if we are to avoid moral schizophrenia, we could not, then, act out of friendship—out of a concern for our friends for their sakes. Stocker's theory is that the only alternative is to split her moral reasons and her motives for friendly acts, thereby becoming schizophrenic. deontologists and consequentialists argue that friendships involve a special concern for the friend . they argue that such relationships demand that one's actions exhibit a kind of partiality towards the friend, causing friendship to be inherently biased . cf. section 2. 2): a friendship cannot properly be appreciated except as involving a concern for another for his sake and as the particular person he is. Railton (1984) distinguishes between subjective and objective consequentialism . he argues that this "friendship critique" of Stocker and Blum (as well as Friedman) succeeds only against subjective consequentialists . in acting as one ought, one's subjective motivations ought to come from moral reasons . stocker, Blum, and Friedman are right to think subjective consequentialism cannot properly accommodate the motives of friendship . Railton argues that sometimes the best states of affairs result not just from undertaking certain behaviors, but from undertaking them with certain motives, including motives that are essentially personal . in particular, he argues, the world would be a better place if each of us had dispositions to act so as to benefit our friends out of a concern for their good . there is no split between our moral reasons for action and our motives because such reasons may in some cases require that in acting we act out of the appropriate sort of motive . so the friendship critique of Stocker, Blum, and Friedman fails. a non-schizophrenic, un-self-deceived consequentialist friend must put the two thoughts together . she must think: "As a consequentialist ... I place special value on you so long, but only so long as valuing you thus promotes the overall good". in a case like this, a consequentialist must "evaluate intrinsic goods [of friendship] and their virtues by reference to a standard external to them" i.e., by referring to the overall good as this is conceived from an impersonal point of view (496). frida ghitis: consequentialism blinds us to the value of friendships and moral reasons they provide for acting out of friendship, all of which can be properly appreciated only from the personal point of view . she says in so doing, it undermines what is distinctive about friendship as such. motivation out of friendship must be personal, so consequentialists agree . they must reject the idea that moral reasons for acting in these cases are your motives . thereby rejecting the relatively weak motivational internalism that is implicit in the friendship critique . the friendship critique of consequentialism needs to be carried on in part at the level of a discussion of the nature of motivation and the connection between moral reasons and motives . the discussion of friendship and moral theories has so far concentrated on the nature of practical reason . john scanlon (1998) uses friendship to argue against what he calls teleological conceptions of values presupposed by consequentialism . he says our recognition of such value provides us with reasons to bring such states of affairs into existence and to sustain and promote them. Hurka argues that this argument presupposes a conception of the value of friendship (as something we ought to respect as well as to promote) that is at odds with the teleological conception of value . the debate must shift to the more general question about the nature of value and cannot be carried out simply by attending to friendship . In a larger sense it has succeeded: it has forced these moral theories to take personal relationships seriously and consequently to refine and complicate their accounts in the process.
Dieser Artikel wurde mit dem automatischen SEO Text Generator mit Künstlicher Intelligenz erstellt - Versuche es kostenlos selbst!

Erstelle ähnliche Artikel:    


Text mit Freunden teilen:    mit Facebook     mit Twitter     mit WhatsApp     mit LinkedIn     mit Email